The choice of health insurance contracts is a critical decision for consumers, impacting their financial security and access to healthcare. This topic has garnered significant attention in academic research, as scholars seek to understand the factors influencing consumer decisions. Despite the availability of extensive information, many people make seemingly irrational decisions, such as underinsuring or overinsuring, and do not act as theory predicts.
The aim of this thesis is to elaborate the basic theoretical concepts for the demand of optimal health insurance contracts. In addition, empirical studies can be compiled that examine the hypotheses from the theory. Reasons for deviations from optimal contracts and possible solutions in the market design from the literature should as well be discussed.
Introductory Literature:
Gollier, C. (2013). The economics of optimal insurance design. In Handbook of insurance (pp. 107-122). New York, NY: Springer New York.
Biener, C., & Zou, L. (2024). More options, more problems? Lost in the health insurance maze. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 91(1), 5-35.
Martinon, P., Picard, P., & Raj, A. (2018). On the design of optimal health insurance contracts under ex post moral hazard. The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, 43(2), 137-185.